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IN THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT-
SUPREME COURT HOLDS EXECUTIVE




HE power to recognize foreign sovereignties is the bedrock ofTAmerican foreign policy, and the U.S. Supreme Court has decided
that only the executive branch may exercise that influential
power.' Although dissenters and some separation of powers scholars ar-
gue that Congress should have a voice in recognizing foreign sovereign-
ties, Zivotofsky v. Kerry was correct in deciding that the recognition
power belongs firmly in the hands of one branch and, thus, that section
214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (the Act) is unconsti-
tutional.2 The Supreme Court appropriately interpreted constitutional
text, historical context, and America's need for firm and explicit diplo-
matic policies.3 In a global climate fraught with conflict, it is essential for
the recognition power to be in the sole hands of the executive branch, the
Nation's face in foreign affairs, as opposed to the legislative branch,
which is divided by biased political voices.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem has plagued the Middle
East for decades, causing the Holy City to be torn between two violent
parties, each one seeking to claim Jerusalem as its capital.4 The Presi-
dent's position on Jerusalem is reflected in the State Department's For-
eign Affairs Manual and its application to foreign-born citizens seeking
passports.5 Since 1948, presidents have refused to recognize any country's
sovereignty over Jerusalem.6 The United States reflected this foreign pot-
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1. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 2088-94.
4. See id. at 2081.
5. See id. at 2082 (citing U.S. Dep't of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1383.5-6
(1987)).
6. See id. at 2081.
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icy stance in section 1383.5-6 of the Foreign Affairs Manual, mandating
that citizens born in Jerusalem record their place of birth solely as "Jeru-
salem," excluding any mention of Israel, Jordan, or Palestine. 7 In 2002, in
direct contradiction with the Foreign Affairs Manual, Congress passed
the Act, which allows citizens born in Jerusalem to list their place of birth
as "Israel."' 8 The enactment of section 214(d) sought to override the For-
eign Affairs Manual and its provisions towards Jerusalem born citizens,
which ultimately resulted in violent protests in the already unstable city
of Jerusalem. 9 Overseas, the world questioned what side of the peace pro-
cess America was truly on, while at home the executive branch and the
legislative branch collided over who held the power to recognize
sovereignty. 10
In 2002, after the Act had passed, Menachem Zivotofsky was born to
U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem." Menachem's parents requested that
the place of birth on his passport be listed as "Jerusalem, Israel," con-
tending that the Act gave them this right.12 When the American Embassy
denied their request, citing the Foreign Affairs Manual, Zivotofsky's par-
ents brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking to enforce section 214(d) of the Act.' 3 The district
court dismissed the suit, holding that it presented a non-justiciable politi-
cal question and that Zivotofsky lacked standing.14 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's political question
holding.1 5 On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case. 16 On remand, the court of appeals held that
section 214(d) impermissibly intruded on an executive branch power, de-
termining that "the President exclusively holds the power to determine
whether to recognize a foreign sovereign," thus, "section 214(d) directly
contradicts a carefully considered exercise of the Executive branch's rec-
ognition power."'1 7 The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.' 8
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court settled the inter-branch dis-
pute in favor of the executive branch, holding that "the power to recog-
7. See id. at 2082 (citing U.S. Dep't of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1383.5-6
(1987)).
8. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. N. 107-228,
§ 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, (2002) ("For purposes of the.., issuance of a passport of a United
States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the
citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.").
9. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2082; James Bennett, Guards Stop Suicide Attack Near
U.S. Embassy in Israel, N.Y. TIMI-S, Oct. 12, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/12/
world/guards-stop-suicide-attack-near-us-embassy-in-israel.html [http://perma.cc/2RNN-
GBJL].
10. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act § 214(d).
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nize or decline to recognize a foreign state and its territorial bounds
resides in the President alone," thus finding that section 214(d) of the Act
is unconstitutional. 19 In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court began
its analysis by referring to Justice Jackson's famous tripartite framework
outlined in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.20 According to Jus-
tice Jackson's analysis, the President's refusal to implement section
214(d) in place of the Foreign Affairs Manual places the President's
power "at its lowest ebb," thus his actions must be "scrutinized with cau-
tion" and he must rely solely upon powers the Constitution grants him.2 1
The Supreme Court considered (1) the specific language and initial inter-
pretation of Article II of the Constitution, including the structure of the
Constitution and the powers it grants to both the legislative and executive
branch, (2) the purpose and policy making exclusive presidential power
necessary, and (3) the precedent and history of presidential recognition
and congressional acquiescence. 22 After holding that the recognition
power belonged exclusively to the executive branch, the Supreme Court
held section 214(d) of the Act unconstitutional. 23
To begin, the Supreme Court focused on the Reception Clause of Arti-
cle II, which states that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers. '24 The Court reflected back on the Nation's early
history, noting that, when President Washington recognized the French
Revolutionary Government by receiving its ambassador, Alexander
Hamilton felt compelled to explain the importance of the clause, namely
that it "includes the power of judging . . . whether the new rulers .. .
ought to be recognized." 25 At the time of founding, other scholars simi-
larly acknowledged that receiving ambassadors was "tantamount to rec-
ognizing the sovereignty of the sending state" by correlating the receiving
of ambassadors with accepting a state's sovereignty. 26 The Supreme
Court thus found that the foreign affairs powers given to the President
under Article II bestowed upon him the power to control all recognition
decisions and to do so on his own initiative. 27 The Court cited the presi-
dential power to negotiate treaties; the ability to nominate and appoint
ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls; and the sole power to open
19. Id. at 2094.
20. Id. at 2083-84; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638).
22. Id. at 2084-95.
23. Id. at 2094-96.
24. Id. at 2085 (quoting U.S. CONsTr. art. II § 3).
25. Id. (quoting A. Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, The Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius 5,
12-14 (1845) ("[The Reception Clause] includes [the power] of judging, in the case of a
revolution of government in a foreign country, whether the new rulers are competent or-
gans of the national will, and out to be recognized, or not.").
26. Id. (quoting E. IN VA-'I'Ei, TIE LAW O1- NATIONS, p. 461 (1758) (J. Chitty ed.,
1853) ("[E]very state, truly possessed of sovereignty, has a right to send ambassadors [and]
to contest their right in this instance [is equivalent to] contesting their sovereign dignity.").
27. Id. (citing U.S. CONsg. art. II § 2).
2016]
SMU LAW REVIEW
diplomatic relations by engaging with foreign leaders.28 In finding that
the Constitution unequivocally granted the power to recognize foreign
sovereignties, the Court contrasted Article II with the powers granted to
Congress under Article I and found that Congress has no constitutional
power to initiate diplomatic relations with foreign nations.29
After determining that the text and structure of the Constitution grants
the President the power to recognize foreign nations, the Court went on
to hold that this power was given exclusively to the President.30 The
Court began with an analysis of the policy implications that the recogni-
tion power held. 31 Opining on the Nation's need for "a single policy re-
garding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United
States" and on foreign ambassadors' need to know "before entering into
diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States, whether their
ambassadors will be received," the Court noted specifically that "these
assurances cannot be equivocal. '32 Further, the Court held that "the
President is capable in ways Congress is not, of engaging in the delicate
and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead to a decision on recog-
nition. '33 And though Congress has a substantial role in making laws,
which gives it authority to determine policy incident to recognition of for-
eign sovereigns, if the President is effectively to recognize nations, "it
must be evident to his counterparts abroad that he speaks for the Nation
on that precise question. '34
Finally, the Court turned to precedent and historical congressional ac-
quiescence to emphasize that the recognition power belongs exclusively
to the executive branch. 35 The Court cited cases, including United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,36 confirming the President's role as "the
sole organ of the government in the field of international relations" and
supporting the conclusion that the President alone has the power to rec-
ognize the legitimacy of foreign nations.37 The Supreme Court examined
the years of congressional acquiescence of Presidents exclusively recog-
nizing foreign nations.38 The first act of recognition came from President
Washington in his recognition of the new French government, illustrated
by his acceptance of the French Ambassador to the United States with
minimal interference from Congress.39 The Court went on to note similar






34. Id. at 2087.
35. Id. at 2088-94.
36. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
37. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088-90 (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 330 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942)).
38. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091-94.
39. Id. at 2091-92 (citing Prakash & Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Af-
fairs, 111 YAiEv L.J. 231, 312 (2001)).
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recognition acts from President Monroe and South America, 40 President
Jackson and Texas, 4 1 President Lincoln and Liberia and Haiti,42 President
McKinley and Cuba,43 and President Carter and the People's Republic of
China,44 all of which establish a trend of acquiescence by Congress in
allowing the President to recognize foreign nations exclusively. The Court
firmly held that 100 years of historical evidence indicates Congress's ac-
ceptance that the recognition power is "exclusive to the Presidency. '45 As
a result of this holding, the Court found section 214(d) of the Act to di-
rectly contradict the executive's prior recognition determination in the
Foreign Affairs Manual.4 6 Thus, section 214(d) was rightly held
unconstitutional.
Dissenting Justices Scalia, Alito, and Roberts wrote chiding dissents
criticizing the majority's disregard of the separation of powers.47 Justice
Roberts, whom Justice Alito joined, focused on the constitutional con-
struction of Article II and contended that the Reception Clause stood
alongside the "duties imposed on the President" not the "powers granted
to him by Article II, Section 2."48 Roberts went on to criticize the major-
ity's interpretation of historical precedent and asserted that the legislative
and executive branches share the recognition power.4 9 Similarly, Justice
Scalia criticized the majority's interpretation of history, noting that his-
torical precedent does not acknowledge the recognition power as exclu-
sive.5 0 He further argued that section 214(d) does not concern
recognition, and that therefore there is no need to hold it unconstitu-
tional, stating that placing "Israel" on a passport is a "deference to pri-
vate requests" and not "a grant of recognition. ' ' 51 Lastly, Justice Scalia
noted his fears that the majority's holding will threaten congressional
power over foreign affairs and erode the very principle of separation of
powers. 52 While the dissenting opinions' contentions have merit, they are
ultimately incorrect and fail to acknowledge the necessity of having the
recognition power solely within the executive branch.
The Supreme Court correctly held that the recognition power belongs
exclusively to the President, especially when the slightest indication of
foreign recognition has the power to invoke political crises overseas. The
40. Id. at 2092 (citing Ju~ius GOEBEL, THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNIrEi)
STATES, pp. 121-25 (1915)).




44. Id. at 2094 (citing Taiwan Relations Act: Hearings on Taiwan Legislation Before the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 2-6 (1979)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2116-2126 (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J., Alito, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 2114.
50. See id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 2119.
52. See id. at 2125-26.
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dissenters confined their analyses of the separation of powers by viewing
the issue through a narrow lens defined by political history and domestic
politics. 53 The dissenters neglected to recognize the magnitude of the ef-
fect that the recognition power has on diplomatic relationships and the
impact it has on the global community.54 In this case, Congress's poten-
tially inadvertent recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem
sparked rampant violence in the states surrounding Jerusalem.55 In one
fell swoop, Congress had seemingly altered the United States' position
over Jerusalem's sovereignty, thereby dismissing years of U.S. neutrality
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 56 After years of violent protests and
heated opposition in response to the initial passing of the Act,57 the Su-
preme Court struck down section 214(d) in hopes of restoring U.S. neu-
trality, but once again contention erupted: the chief Palestinian
negotiator praised the decision, stating "it sends a clear message to Israel
that its policies of colonization are null and void," while the Jerusalem
Mayor responded by saying that "Jerusalem was and always will be the
capital of Israel, and the heart and soul of the Jewish people. '58 Foreign
diplomacy is fragile in today's combative global environment, and the re-
lationships it fosters can be altered or broken in an instant. Because the
President commands American foreign relations agents, the executive
branch is the voice of the United States and the leader to whom the world
turns for answers. 59 When making the decision as to whom the recogni-
tion power belongs, one cannot dwell in the past, but instead must look to
the current state of affairs and the erratic foreign climate that only the
President has the power to control.
Furthermore, Congress is poorly constructed and lacks the ability to
perform effectively under the tight time constraints often involved in for-
eign diplomacy. Congress is a 535-member debating body often divided
by partisan politics. 60 If Congress were to control the recognition of for-
eign nations, it would need to pass legislation to make its decisions legally
effective; such actions require Congress to satisfy the bicameralism and
presentment requirements. 61 The presentment clauses require Congress
53. See id. at 2113-26.
54. See id.
55. See Thousands protest in Gaza against US support of Israeli claim to Jerusalem,
THE DAILY STAR LEBANON (Oct. 5, 2002), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-
News/2002/Oct-05/15596-thousands-protest-in-gaza-against-us-support-of-israeli-claim-to-
jerusalem.ashx [perma.cc/SW2L-7BAU].
56. See Brief for the Respondent at 4, Zivotovsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (No.
13-628) (quoting Letter from George P. Schulz, "U.S. Presidents have consistently endeav-
ored to maintain a strict policy of not prejudging the Jerusalem status issue and thus not
engaging in official actions that would recognize, or might be perceived as constituting
recognition [of Jerusalem] as a city located within the sovereignty territory of Israel").
57. See Tm DALY STAR LiBANON, supra note 57.
58. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Backs White House on Jerusalem Passport Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2015, at Al.
59. See Harold Hongji Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Af-
fairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1291-97 (1988).
60. See id.
61. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983).
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to present all legislation to the President, while bicameralism requires
"the concurrence of the prescribed Members of both Houses" after a
"full study and debate in separate settings" of the issues.62 In contrast to
Congress's protracted decision-making process, the presidency is ideally
structured for the exercise of the recognition power. The President has
the independence and discretion necessary to make decisions about rec-
ognition quickly and without hesitation.63 The President is in a better po-
sition to recognize foreign sovereignties in the short timeframes that are
required to maintain stable diplomatic relations and to prevent the ten-
sion that arises from forcing countries to wait for a decision.64
The Supreme Court's decision in Zivotosfky came at a time of strained
relations between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. Though the two nations are allied militarily, the personal re-
lationship between the leaders has grown increasingly contentious re-
garding U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran.65 The Court's decision,
therefore, may disrupt diplomatic relations between the two countries
even further, perhaps forcing the United States to take a more explicit
stance on recognizing either Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty as it relates
to Jerusalem.66
The Court found section 214(d) of the Act unconstitutional, and held
that passports for citizens born in Jerusalem cannot bear the word
"Israel," ultimately settling the inter-branch dispute over the recognition
power.67 The President alone has the structural power necessary to carry
out the delicate task of recognizing foreign nations, and he or she alone
can provide assurances to unstable foreign nations on the brink of war
over issues of sovereignty and recognition. As the Supreme Court has
correctly held, constitutional text, structure, and historical interpretation
support the undeniable conclusion that the recognition power belongs ex-
clusively to the executive branch. 68
62. Id. at 948-49.
63. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
64. See Koh, supra note 59, at 1291-97.
65. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Says President's Powers Prevail on Foreign




67. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094-96 (2015).
68. See id.
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